# 8

# JOINT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

## General

This chapter reviews the previous chapters by highlighting and integrating significant management issues.

## Program Office Structure

Joint program management should start with the user's vision of the military requirement, e.g., more lethal and supportable munitions or wide area, all-weather battlefield surveillance. The joint program manager (PM) should then think in broad terms about the best program office structure to meet those requirements. Traditionally, these structures have ranged from a jointly staffed program office with ties to component points of contact to a single component program office receiving some funding from other Components.

## Program Office Charter

Joint programs require a charter to formalize their roles and missions and to clarify joint standing with the components. Although there is no set format for these charters, the following areas should be addressed:

- Designation of the program;
- Statement of program objectives;
- Joint PM's role and accountability consistent with Department of Defense (DoD) 5000 Documents;

- Specification for joint funding consistent with withdrawal rules discussed in Chapter 2;
- Definition of component roles;
- Reporting requirements consistent with DoD 5000 Documents prohibitions on dual reporting;
- Program office organization and initial staffing;
- Joint operating procedures;
- Assignment of a deputy PM, usually from the major participating component;
- Methods of resolving component conflicts, usually referral to a higher authority;
- Creation of joint committees for source selection, test, and evaluation plans, etc.;
- Performance evaluations of personnel; and
- Provisions to review and update the charter.

**Management**

Joint PMs must deal with changes in component requirements, doctrine, tactics, and funding. Figure 8-1 describes the affect of this on program documentation.

**Changes to the Threat**

As mentioned earlier, joint PMs must be particularly sensitive to the military environment of their program. Significant changes in these areas have ripple effects on the integrated program documentation, especially its risk assessment, the test




**Figure 8-1. Required Changes in Program Documentation**

and evaluation master plan (TEMP), the request for proposal (RFP), the operational requirements document (ORD), engineering specifications, and the system threat assessment.

### Operational Requirements/Performance Changes

The nature of joint programs can result in changes and "requirements creep." Range, payload, and other changes need to be documented in the risk assessment, Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), logistics support plan, TEMP, engineering specifications, RFP, ORD, and system threat assessment. Related operational performance parameter changes require the same documentation, without any system threat assessment changes.

### Operational Issues and Tactics Changes

Joint programs are also more subject to changes in user employment concepts and tactics. For example, the Air Force may publish a new Bomber Road Map that affects the program, or relatively new peacekeeping requirements in support of United Nations-controlled forces may cause program requirement changes. The analysis of alternatives, TEMP, and ORD should be updated to reflect operational changes.

### Software Requirements and Testing

Changes in software requirements and testing also ripple through a joint program, much like a major operational change, because of the pervasive influence of software in modern weapon systems.

### Change and Uncertainty

As discussed in Chapter 7, systems analysis of relationships is a useful tool for joint PMs. The joint PM should expect more changes in their program for the reasons discussed in this Hand-

book and adaptively plan to integrate changes and reduce uncertainty in key program areas.

The program team, including contractors and component budget staffs, can adapt to change, but uncertainty about key production decisions is likely to drive up costs and otherwise adversely affect the program. Therefore, program control must emphasize communications to help the program staff adjust to change constructively and not to become unfavorably altered by uncertainty. Strong leadership is needed to meet program goals in a dynamically changing geopolitical and physical environment.

**Political Dynamics**

As explained in Chapter 1, the definition of a joint program includes multiple users. These users and their constituencies will exert pressure on the joint PM through requirements changes and fiscal decisions. The joint PM needs to understand the concerns of users and component proponents, accommodate their needs in the program to the extent that they can, or explain real technical and fiscal limitations in a way that program constituents can understand. This process is complicated by cultural differences in component doctrine, jargon, and planning. Furthermore, the joint PM must always be aware that senior defense officials and the Congress may become involved in very large or well-publicized joint programs.

> *Technology provided the means to win the Gulf War, but it was leadership, the painstaking creation of a quality force, and years of hard training that brought the victory about. (Col Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA, Ret, On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 1992.)*